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LOCAL LAWS RESTRICTING THE FREEDOM OF 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS AS VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
L. DARNELL WEEDEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of cities across America have enacted local regulations that 
restrict the ability of persons to engage in contractual relations with individuals 
classified as undocumented immigrants.  Undocumented immigrants and their 
supporters have challenged the validity of laws that make it illegal for 
landlords and other providers of services to enter into contracts or agreements 
with them.  The topic presented for discussion here is whether local laws 
restricting the freedom to contract with undocumented immigrants are either 
prohibited by the suspect class rationale of the Equal Protection Clause or 
preempted by federal immigration law. 
Not all cities have enacted laws hostile toward undocumented immigrants.  
New Haven, Connecticut, for instance welcomes immigrants regardless of their 
official immigration status.1  However, in nearby Suffolk County on Long 
Island, laws keep undocumented day laborers off the streets and punish 
companies that hire them.2  Suffolk County executives, like other local 
government officials, cite the economic and social harms that accompany 
undocumented immigrants as the reasoning behind such openly hostile laws.3  
This Article focuses on this latter type of local law, laws which evince hostility 
toward undocumented immigrants. The Article evaluates whether such laws 
violate equal protection or are preempted by federal immigration law. 
Part I of this Article presents the context of America’s current failure to 
articulate a single voice on the issue of undocumented immigrants.  Part II 
examines whether the Equal Protection Clause should prohibit local 
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 1. Jennifer Medina, New Haven Welcomes Immigrants, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
2007, at B1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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government from imposing group-based hostility against all immigrants, 
including undocumented immigrants.  Part III addresses whether the 
Constitution’s express grant of power to the federal government to regulate 
immigration as a general matter preempts local laws regulating immigration.  
The Article concludes that local immigration laws which are hostile toward 
undocumented immigrants violate the Equal Protection Clause and are, in any 
case, preempted by federal immigration law. 
I.  AMERICA CURRENTLY FAILS TO ARTICULATE A SINGLE VOICE ON THE ISSUE 
OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
Local municipalities and cities have adopted wide-ranging approaches to 
undocumented immigrants.  No single, united voice has emerged.  The State of 
Connecticut is a prime example.  In New Haven, police do not question 
individuals’ immigration status, essentially amounting to a “don’t ask, don’t 
tell” immigration policy.4  Stamford has established “no hassle” zones for the 
benefit of day laborers, allowing undocumented immigrants to seek work 
without fear of arrest.5  But, other cities in Connecticut have not been as 
hospitable.  After the city of Danbury became attractive to illegal immigrants, 
Republican Mayor Mark Boughton began attacking failed federal immigration 
policies and embarked on an immigration crackdown of his own.6  Mayor 
Boughton requested that the United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement enforce existing federal immigration law in Danbury, resulting in 
dozens of arrests.7 
Many cities hoping to drive out illegal immigrant populations have 
followed the lead of Hazleton, Pennsylvania.  Hazleton was the first city in the 
United States to approve regulations for the purpose of encouraging illegal 
immigrants to leave the community by penalizing local landlords for renting to 
illegal immigrants and punishing local employers for hiring them.8  A 
minimum of eighty towns and cities have adopted similar regulations.9  On 
March 12, 2007, a test case challenging Hazleton’s ability to regulate 
immigration began in federal court.10  The Hazleton case helps to frame the 
debate.  Supporters maintain that Hazleton’s regulations are a very reasonable 
response to a “very real threat,” one involving spikes in violent crime and gang 
 
 4. Editorial, Immigration: A Tale of Three Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A15. 
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warfare.11  Critics contend that regulations like Hazleton’s promote 
discrimination against Hispanic residents and exceed the permissible authority 
of a local government to regulate immigration.12  The regulation of 
immigration is almost completely a matter of federal concern, requiring action 
only by the Federal Congress.13  The remainder of this Article examines the 
extent to which laws such as Hazleton’s violate the Equal Protection Clause 
and are preempted by federal immigration law. 
II.  THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE SHOULD PROHIBIT A LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FROM IMPOSING GROUP-BASED HOSTILITY AGAINST ALL 
IMMIGRANTS, INCLUDING UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
The United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”14  A number of 
Supreme Court decisions have concluded that a state or city may not deny 
persons the equal protections of the law by showing intentional group-based 
hostility toward a class of persons.  In footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., the Supreme Court stated that under certain 
circumstances a politically powerless group may need judicial intervention to 
protect them from the political hostility of the majority.15  Professor Roosevelt 
correctly observes that Carolene Products is often cited by legal experts as the 
basis of the equal protection suspect class policy.16  Carolene Products 
footnote four was originally intended to be used in due process cases.17  The 
Supreme Court first cited Carolene Products in the 1971 suspect class equal 
protection case Graham v. Richardson, a case that labeled aliens as a “prime 
example of a “‘discrete and insular’ minority.”18  In Graham, the Supreme 
Court stated that a state’s wish to safeguard limited welfare benefits for its own 
citizens is not a proper basis for a policy that makes non-citizens ineligible for 
public benefits; a state also may not limit its public welfare benefits to only 
citizens and resident aliens who have lived within the state for a certain length 
of time.19  Under established equal protection doctrine, “a State retains broad 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Preston, supra note 8. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 15. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (listing racial minorities as particularly defenseless). 
 16. Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget The Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 996 (2006) (citing  Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (describing Carolene Products as “the moment the Court began constructing modern 
equal protection doctrine”)). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)). 
 19. 403 U.S. at 374. 
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discretion to classify as long as its classification has a reasonable basis.”20  
Supreme Court opinions now hold that classifications based on alienage, 
nationality, or race are fundamentally suspect and subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny.21  The power of a state to target its laws exclusively at its documented 
immigrant population as a class must be justified by a compelling state 
interest.22 
It is clear that the city of Hazleton has enacted a law that singles out 
undocumented immigrants for hostile treatment by punishing landlords who 
rent to them and employers who hire them.23  The “‘singling out’” problem by 
a local governmental entity is reasonably understood as an illustration of 
Carolene Products’s “discrete and insular minorities” forewarning of violating 
the equal protection of the laws.24  Carolene Products advises that when 
political minorities, such as undocumented immigrants, are confronted with the 
problem of the political majority crushing their rights to the equal protection of 
the law, judicial intervention is appropriate.25  While Carolene Products 
observed that identifiable racial, ethnic, or religious minorities without a real 
voice are most likely to become the victims of majority political abuse, “the 
problem of majoritarian excess extends well beyond those groups.”26  In the 
framework of immigration and local regulation, when majorities pander to the 
temptation to place particular burdens on undocumented immigrants, 
minorities who are nonvoting residents in a city, the normal political process 
provides very little equal protection.27  It is as a defense against this type of 
political abuse that a judicial application of the Equal Protection Clause serves 
as a check on local laws regulating immigration.28  Carolene Products’ 
heightened scrutiny is appropriate in those circumstances, like Hazleton, where 
a particular minority group is singled out and afforded little protection because 
of defects in the political process.29 
 
 20. Id. at 371 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–27(1961)); Morey v. Doud, 
354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)). 
 21. Id. at 371–72. 
 22. Id. at 372. 
 23. See Preston, supra note 8. 
 24. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the 
Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 911 (2006).  In the property context, 
Professor Karkkainen argues that the Carolene Products rationale of protecting minority property 
interests against majority property interests should apply to takings clause cases with a “Carolene 
Products-like heightened scrutiny” by courts.  Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Karkkainen, supra note 24. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “deny[ing] to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”30  It has long been 
settled that the term “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
lawfully admitted resident aliens and American citizens, entitling both citizens 
and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the state in which they reside.31  
It is my position that the word “person” under the Equal Protection Clause 
protects undocumented immigrants against local laws that express a hostile 
intent toward undocumented immigrants who may have violated federal 
immigration law by entering the United States without proper documentation.  
Professors Posner and Vermeule recognize that, at a superficial level, the 
Carolene Products analysis gives the impression that it should be applied more 
for the benefit of  aliens than for political or ethnic minorities because aliens, 
unlike racial minorities, do not have a general right to vote.32  Because aliens 
do not have the right to vote, “they cannot directly affect political outcomes 
and thus would seem especially vulnerable to exploitation by the majority.”33  
Courts, using the Carolene Products theory, may offer aliens a great deal of 
protection by applying strict scrutiny to any law that discriminates against a 
person based on alienage.34 
However, Professors Posner and Vermeule go on to expressly reject the 
application of the Carolene Products suspect class theory to aliens.35  A fallacy 
in the Carolene Products view is, they claim, the failure to understand that 
promoting the welfare of both resident and nonresident aliens is itself a 
component of protecting the welfare of the voting majority, “so the self-
interest of the majority need not produce exploitation of the minority.”36  
Professors Posner and Vermule argue that, because the general welfare of 
aliens serves the welfare interest of the voting majority, it is not necessary for 
courts to apply the Carolene Products suspect classification theory to either 
documented or undocumented aliens.37  Although there may be a number of 
instances where the general welfare of the political majority and the 
undocumented aliens are the same, I think courts should continue to apply 
Carolene Products to aliens to protect them from being at risk of hostile 
discrimination by the political majority. 
 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 31. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 
(1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). 
 32. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1091, 1138 (2006). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1139–40. 
 36. Id. at 1140. 
 37. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1140–41. 
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Recent events involving the Texas legislature are illustrative.  In Texas, 
powerful economic interests intervened to protect undocumented aliens or 
immigrants from an anti-immigrant backlash favored by a political majority.  It 
was generally believed that anti-immigrant fever would spread to Texas in 
2007.38  Texas lawmakers entered the new legislative session with many bills 
expressing a variety of anti-immigrant passions.39  However, during the last 
week of March 2007, the Texas legislature refused to join the anti-immigration 
fight because of an unusual alliance supporting sensible immigration reform.40  
In a sudden change, the influential Republican Chairman of the State Affairs 
Committee, David Swinford, refused to allow the immigration bills to come to 
the floor, citing them as “constitutionally flawed, needlessly divisive and a 
waste of time.”41  Importantly, Representative Swinford represents an 
agricultural district that could lose a lot of money if the district lost its 
immigrant labor.42  Though Swinford persists he did not hold back any anti-
immigration bills at the behest of big business, he has certainly made big 
business happy in Texas.43  In Texas, “at least for now, powerful forces have 
come to understand—whether through warm feelings for workers or, more 
likely, cold self-interest―that in attacking immigrants, Texas is attacking 
itself.”44 
The irony of the current Texas debate on immigration is that big business 
interests in the State protected undocumented immigrants from the otherwise 
hostile anti-immigration political mood of the legislature.  Though seeming to 
support the conclusions of Professors Posner and Vermeule, the Carolene 
Products question is whether the interests of the politically influential can 
always be relied upon to ensure that undocumented immigrants are given the 
equal protection of the law that other members of society enjoy.  In a spirit of 
self-interest, business may encourage society to tolerate undocumented or 
illegal immigrants, not as equals but as sources of cheap labor.45  If the 
judiciary fails to guarantee undocumented immigrants the equal protection of 
the law, they are likely to be exploited by employers as a cheap and 
expendable labor supply.  Although the Texas legislature is to be commended 
for its refusal to adopt hostile legislation toward immigrants, it should be noted 
 
 38. Lawrence Downes, Editorial, After an Anti-Immigrant Flare-Up, Texas Gets Back to 
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007, at A22.  The general belief was supported by harsh rhetoric.  
Representative Leo Berman stated: “Mexico is the world’s most corrupt country and that its 
citizens are infecting us with their law-breaking culture and with tuberculosis and leprosy.”  Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Downes, supra note 38. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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that the Texas legislature did not adopt any affirmative resolution as a 
legislative body requesting Congress to adopt appropriate immigration 
legislation designed to deal with reality and accommodate the needs of current 
employers hiring undocumented immigrants as well as the needs of current 
undocumented immigrants residing in communities throughout America.  The 
self-interest of the majority is a far from sufficient basis for protecting 
undocumented immigrants from hostility.  Undocumented immigrants or 
illegal aliens should be granted suspect class status and protected from state 
legislation because they are persons who should be protected from the hostile 
political process.  The principles of Carolene Products should demand that 
local governments establish a compelling justification for the unequal 
treatment of undocumented immigrants. 
The need for heightened scrutiny was made apparent by a recent case in 
Tennessee.  Under the traditional rational basis standard, undocumented 
immigrants will not be adequately protected from a hostile local political 
environment.  A federal district court in Tennessee rejected the argument that 
illegal aliens are entitled to suspect class status under the Equal Protection 
Clause and instead applied rational basis review.46  A state law enacted in 2004 
amended the Tennessee Code by stating that only United States citizens or 
lawful permanent residents were eligible to receive driver’s licenses in 
Tennessee.47  Under the Tennessee law, individuals who were in the United 
States with the permission of the federal government for a particular purpose 
and for a particular period of time are qualified to acquire a certificate for 
driving that may be valid for one to five years.48  A person not covered as a 
citizen, a lawful permanent resident, or residing in the United States under 
specific federal authority could get an official driving certificate for one year.49  
The driving certificate displayed on its face the words: “FOR DRIVING 
PURPOSES ONLY—NOT VALID FOR IDENTIFICATION.”50 
In LULAC, the plaintiffs contended that the Tennessee law barring illegal 
aliens as well as those aliens who do not possess permanent resident status 
from acquiring a driver’s license establishes an unconstitutional classification 
under the Equal Protection Clause rooted in alienage.51  It is a basic principle 
of law that the Equal Protection Clause states that “all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike.”52  In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court 
 
 46. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, No. 3:04-0613, 2004 WL 
3048724, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004). 
 47. Id. at *1 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-321(c)(1)(C) (2004)). 
 48. Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-331(g)). 
 49. Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-331(h)). 
 50. Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-102(6)). 
 51. LULAC, 2004 WL 3048724, at *2. 
 52. Id. at *3 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). 
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ruled that aliens are “persons” for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.53  
A state law that fails to burden a suspect class “must be upheld against equal 
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification.”54 
The federal district court accepted the plaintiffs’ basic argument that 
classifications based on alienage are intrinsically suspect.55  The federal court 
stated, however, that the Tennessee law “does not classify persons based on 
alienage.”56  The Tennessee law distinguishes “between citizens and lawful 
permanent resident aliens on the one hand, and illegal aliens and those aliens 
who are not permanent lawful residents, on the other hand.”57  The 
classification produced by the driver’s license law is not simply between aliens 
and citizens.58  The Tennessee driver’s license law does not treat people 
differently because of a protected classification.59  Aliens are able to meet the 
requirements for a driver’s license or a driver’s certificate based on legitimate 
criteria excluding alienage.60  “Instead,” the court found, “the classification is 
based on the legality of the alien’s presence in the country under federal law 
(lawful permanent resident aliens vs. illegal aliens) and/or the length of time 
the federal government has authorized the alien to stay in this country 
(permanent vs. temporary).”61  The federal district court opined that the 
Tennessee driver’s license law did not have to meet the strict scrutiny test 
because it failed to burden a suspect class.62 
It appears that Tennessee officially acknowledges the presence of persons 
living in its borders that it presumes to be undocumented immigrants living in 
 
 53. Id. at *3 n.1 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215). 
 54. Id. at *3 (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307 (1993)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. LULAC, 2004 WL 3048724, at *3. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. LULAC, 2004 WL 3048724, at *3 and n.2 (citing Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 
1255–56 (10th Cir. 2004) (discrimination among subclasses of aliens based on non-suspect 
classifications, such as work history or military service, is subject to rational basis review); Doe 
v. Comm. of Transnational Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 414 (Mass. 2002) (“In distinguishing 
between subgroups of aliens, rational basis review is appropriate unless classification is based on 
race, gender, national origin, or other suspect classification.”)).  “The distinctions here, rather, are 
based on non-suspect classifications such as the legality of presence and length of authorized stay. 
In any event, the State has shown the legislation furthers a compelling state interest by the least 
restrictive means.  As discussed below, the State has a compelling interest in balancing driver 
safety, on the one hand, and the deterrence/prevention of crime and terrorist activity, on the other. 
Drawing the classification based on legality of presence and the length of authorized stay is the 
least restrictive means to achieve the State’s compelling interests.”  Id. at *3 n.2 (citation 
omitted).  “Illegal aliens, moreover, are not a ‘suspect class’ under the Constitution.” Id. at * 3. 
 62. Id. at * 3. 
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America illegally by granting those persons a certificate of driving while 
denying those individuals a driving license.  When Tennessee issues a person a 
driving certificate that says the certificate is not officially recognized for 
identification purposes, the state is substantially certain that, in fact, the 
driver’s certificate will identify those possessing it as inferior persons because 
of their presumed illegal entry into the United States.  It is my belief that the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from 
issuing a driver’s certificate that has both the purpose and effect of 
demonstrating hostility toward a group of individuals because of their 
presumed illegal immigrant status.  It should be a fundamental principle of 
American law that all persons, including illegal aliens, are presumed innocent 
until they are proven guilty.  Until Tennessee is authorized by the federal 
government to enforce the nation’s immigration policy, it does not have any 
rational basis to independently enforce the lawful entry requirement of federal 
immigration laws against those it presumes to be illegal aliens. 
In LeClerc v. Webb, nonimmigrant alien graduates from foreign law 
schools filed suit under the Equal Protection Clause challenging a Louisiana 
Supreme Court Rule making them ineligible to sit for the Louisiana Bar.63  The 
plaintiffs argued that: “(1) . . . nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class and state 
laws affecting them are subject to strict scrutiny; (2) . . . nonimmigrant aliens 
are a quasi-suspect class and state laws affecting them are subject to is 
intermediate scrutiny; and (3) . . . if nonimmigrant aliens are not a suspect class 
at all, any state law affecting them are subject to rational basis review.”64  In 
the face of some doubt about relevant Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth 
Circuit stated that, because the Louisiana Supreme Court Rule involves only 
nonimmigrant aliens, the rational basis standard of review applied.65  The Fifth 
Circuit found that the Louisiana Supreme Court Rule survived the rational 
basis test.66 
Nonimmigrant aliens are not considered a suspect class under Griffiths.67  
In Griffiths, the challenger to the state law was a permanent resident alien, who 
 
 63. 419 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2005). 
The Immigration and Nationality Act distinguishes between immigrant and nonimmigrant 
aliens, negatively defining an immigrant alien as “every alien except an alien who is 
within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) 
[IMMLS PSD INA § 101].  An alien falling into one of fifteen exclusionary categories is 
a nonimmigrant alien, a class generally delimited by a lack of intention to abandon his 
foreign country residence and entry into the United States for specific and temporary 
purposes. 
Id. at 410 n.2. 
 64. Id. at 415. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 422. 
 67. Id.  at 415 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973)). 
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was not eligible under Connecticut law for bar admission because he was not a 
United States citizen.68  The LeClerc plaintiffs that challenged the Louisiana 
Supreme Court Rule were nonimmigrant aliens.69  The Louisiana Supreme 
Court Rule impacted only nonimmigrant aliens, those aliens who were “not 
entitled to live and work in the United States permanently.”70  It was the total 
exclusion of aliens in Connecticut from the practice of law that the United 
States Supreme Court held invalid under the Constitution in Griffiths.71  The 
Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny only to those state laws affecting 
permanent resident aliens.72  According to the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
has in no way applied the strict scrutiny standard to a state law impacting 
illegal aliens or nonimmigrant aliens.73 
It is my view that the Supreme Court should apply its strict scrutiny 
rationale to any immigrant, regardless of his or her immigration status, who 
has become a target of hostile local governmental policy.  A local 
governmental regulation designed to discourage undocumented immigrants 
from residing in the community because they are presumed to be in violation 
of federal immigration laws demonstrates irrational political hostility toward 
the immigrant because the local government cannot enforce federal 
immigration laws without the permission of Congress.  Local laws which 
restrict a person’s freedom of contract and serve as a pretext for the 
impermissible enforcement of federal immigration laws are especially suspect 
when they target an individual because of his presumed federal immigration 
status. 
Judge Carl E. Stewart dissented from the LeClerc majority’s position that 
the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim was properly dismissed and disagreed 
with the conclusion that the strict scrutiny standard did not apply to the 
 
 68. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (quoting In re Bourke, 819 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (La. 2002)). 
 71. Id. (citing Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 718). 
 72. Id. 
 73. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 416. 
In such cases, the Court has either foregone Equal Protection analysis, see Toll v. Moreno, 
458 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 73 L.Ed.2d 563 (1982) (nonimmigrant G-4 aliens); DeCanas 
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976) (illegal aliens), or has applied a 
modified rational basis review, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 
L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (children of illegal aliens). In the latter case, Plyler, the Court 
employed a heightened level of rational basis review to invalidate a Texas law that denied 
primary public education to children of illegal aliens. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (“[the 
Texas law] can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of 
the State.”) (emphasis added).  Yet, while adopting a sui generis level of rational basis 
review, the Court acknowledged that the immigration status of the affected class of aliens 
precluded use of either intermediate or strict scrutiny review. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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plaintiffs’ status as nonimmigrant aliens.74  The majority’s refusal to apply the 
strict scrutiny rationale to nonimmigrant aliens as part of a discrete suspect 
class is not required by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.75  
Judge Stewart correctly critiqued the majority’s reasoning as flawed because 
the Supreme Court’s proclamation that “alienage is a suspect class” designates 
nonimmigrant aliens as members of that class.76  The Supreme Court has stated 
that “[t]he fact that the [challenged] statute is not an absolute bar [against all 
aliens] does not mean that it does not discriminate against the class.”77  When 
governmental policy or regulations target aliens, and when only aliens are 
harmed by the conduct, the suspect class theory is triggered, and the state 
action may violate the Equal Protection Clause if it is not supported by a 
compelling justification.78  It follows that a local law containing a rental ban 
that prohibits landlords from renting to immigrants based on their presumed 
status as not lawfully present in the United States, when motivated by political 
hostility, should at a minimum be subjected to strict scrutiny to test its 
constitutional validity under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Judge Stewart’s LeClerc dissent argues that nonimmigrant aliens who are 
lawfully present in the United States are entitled to the benefit of the suspect 
classification.79  In his analysis, Judge Stewart acknowledged that the Supreme 
Court had refused to grant suspect classification to illegal aliens.80  In Plyler, 
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it rejected the assertion that “illegal 
aliens” were members of a suspect class: 
No case in which we have attempted to define a suspect class . . . has 
addressed the status of persons unlawfully in our country.  Unlike most of the 
classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by 
virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action.  Indeed, 
entry into the class is itself a crime.81 
Unlike the Supreme Court, I believe an economically productive illegal 
alien who obeys the law except for his unlawful entry into America is entitled 
to the benefit of the suspect classification status in order to protect him from 
hostile local governmental action because of his federal immigration status.  
An America which values democratic principles will grant suspect category 
status to aliens as a group because their interests are not protected in the 
political process because they cannot vote.  I am advancing the argument that a 
 
 74. Id. at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 427 (quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). 
 78. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 427 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 428. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982). 
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local governmental entity should be allowed to treat an illegal immigrant 
differently from other immigrants only when it can meet the strict scrutiny 
standard.  The basis for the suspect class designation for those aliens with 
lawful presence in the United States is based on aliens’ inability to vote, which 
renders them impotent in the political process, as well as the extensive history 
of invidious discrimination suffered by legal aliens.82  Because millions of 
illegal immigrants are productive members of our society without the ability to 
vote, a state or local government should be required to have a compelling 
justification for laws targeting them.83 
The distinction between legal and illegal immigrants “is one of the most 
tenaciously held distinctions in middle-class America; the people . . . 
overwhelmingly support legal immigration and express disgust with the illegal 
variety.”84  The fact that many in middle class America are disgusted with 
illegal immigrants who are often welcomed by farmers and the food industry 
supports my conclusion that laws targeting illegal immigrants should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny.  The illegal immigrant employee is often caught up 
in a battle between powerful economic interests with national influence and the 
hostile power of local political interest that want them to vacate the community 
immediately. 
That Americans generally support legal immigration was evident from the 
broad public support for the recently-failed immigration bill before the United 
States Senate.  The bill contained provisions that would have allowed 
undocumented immigrants a path to citizenship, which caused a degree of 
political consternation for both parties.85  Though a substantial majority of 
Democrats supported giving the 12 million or so illegal immigrants a path to 
citizenship, they found a few of the bill’s provisions objectionable.86  For 
Republicans, the political implications of the Senate immigration bill were 
more challenging.  Republican core constituencies did not agree on the bill.87  
Business groups unquestionably supported it, but various social and cultural 
 
 82. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 428–29 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.14 
(citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (1997); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 
(1948); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 618–19)). 
 83. See Immigration: A Tale of Three Cities, supra note 4 (stating that federal immigration 
policy has allowed 11 million people to move to the United States illegally). 
 84. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The 
Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 107 (2001) (quoting ALAN WOLFE, 
ONE NATION, AFTER ALL 147 (1998)). 
 85. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Op-Ed., Immigration Agitation: The Way to Guarantee the Rights and 
Wages of All Americans is to Give Every Immigrant the Opportunity to Become a Citizen, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE, May 29, 2007, at B7. 
 86. Id.  Two of the more objectionable provisions from the Democratic viewpoint were the 
“return home” requirements and preferential treatment afforded those immigrants with desirable 
employment and educational skills.  Id. 
 87. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] LOCAL LAWS RESTRICTING THE FREEDOM OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 491 
conservatives (except some religious conservatives) considered any type of 
large-scale legalization of undocumented immigrants as “amnesty.”88  Despite 
these political differences, polling showed that Americans broadly supported 
the major provisions in the bill: “A large majority of Americans want to 
change the immigration laws to allow illegal immigrants to gain legal status 
and to create a new guest worker program to meet future labor demands.”89 
That Americans clearly support legal immigrants, but show open hostility 
and disgust toward undocumented immigrants belies the need for the 
protection afforded undocumented immigrants by the Carolene Products 
suspect class designation.  Certainly, it cannot and will not be the case that the 
self-interest of the politically influential will protect undocumented immigrants 
from hostile local immigration laws.  Carolene Products’s heightened scrutiny, 
requiring a demonstrable compelling interest for the enactment of local 
immigration laws, affords undocumented immigrants the protection otherwise 
unavailable through the political process. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTION’S EXPRESS GRANT OF POWER TO CONGRESS TO 
REGULATE IMMIGRATION AS A GENERAL MATTER PREEMPTS LOCAL LAWS 
REGULATING IMMIGRATION 
Preemption principles also preclude municipalities, cities, and states from 
enacting laws hostile to undocumented immigrants.  Immigration policy falls 
within the domain of the Federal Congress, and states are barred from enacting 
their own legislation as a pretext for establishing local immigration policy not 
authorized by Congress. 
One such example is Tennessee.  On May 11, 2005, Congress passed the 
“Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act For Defense, The Global War 
On Terror, Tsunami Relief, 2005,” which contains Division B “The REAL ID 
Act of 2005.”90  The REAL ID Act pronounces that three years after the date 
of its enactment, a federal agency is prohibited from accepting for any official 
purpose a driver’s license or identification certificate given out by a state to 
anyone unless the state complies with specific federal requirements.91  Under 
the Act, “official purpose” includes “accessing Federal facilities, boarding 
federally regulated commercial aircraft” as well as “entering nuclear power 
plants, and any other purposes that the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Julia Preston & Marjorie Connelly, Immigration Bill Provisions Gain Wide Support In 
Poll, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at A1. 
 90. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC II), No. 3:04-0613, 2005 WL 
2034935, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–
13, 119 Stat. 231, §§ 201–202). 
 91. Id. (citing The REAL ID Act of 2005, § 202(a)(1)). 
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determine.”92  Subsection 202(c)(1) of the Act catalogs the kind of 
identification information that a person is required to make available prior to a 
state giving out a license or card, and Section 202(c)(2) commands 
authentication “by valid documentary evidence” of a person’s citizenship or 
immigration ranking.93  Section 202(c)(3)(B) asserts that to comply with the 
obligations of Subsections 202(c)(1) or (2), “[t]he State may not accept any 
foreign document other than an official passport.”94 
The United States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States 
are the “supreme Law of the Land.”95  The opposing parties in League of 
United Latin American Citizens  v. Bredesen (LULAC II ) agreed that the 
REAL ID Act of 2005 preempts Tennessee’s law requiring the issuance of an 
official driving certificate for those unable to establish United States 
citizenship or other lawful presence in the United States.96  A contention that 
the Supremacy Clause allows a federal law to preempt a state regulation is 
different from an argument for the enforcement of that federal law.97  “The 
primary function of the Supremacy Clause is to define the relationship between 
state and federal law.  It is essentially a power conferring provision, one that 
allocates authority between the national and state governments . . . .”98  A 
claim under the Supremacy Clause, in basic terms, declares that a federal 
statute denies local authority the ability to regulate an undertaking.99 
Although the Supremacy Clause allows Congress to preempt state 
regulation, I think the better argument suggests that the REAL ID Act of 2005 
does not deny Tennessee the ability to issue an official driving certificate for 
those not capable of proving lawful presence in the United States.  Unlike the 
federal district court in Tennessee, I am not convinced that the REAL ID Act’s 
terms governing the type of identity documents required to acquire a driver’s 
license impliedly preempt Tennessee’s law on the topic.  The fact that the 
REAL ID Act authorizes a state to give out driver’s licenses by means of an 
 
 92. Id. (citing The REAL ID Act of 2005, § 201(3)). 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. (citing The REAL ID Act of 2005 § 202(c)(3)(B)). 
 95. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  In full, the Supremacy Clause provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
 96. LULAC II, 2005 WL 2034935, at *2. 
 97. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 817 F.2d 222, 
225 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 98. Id. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844, 848 (9th 
Cir.1987)). 
 99. Id. 
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optional identification verification procedure provides evidence that Congress 
did not intend to preempt Tennessee’s ability to issue driving certificates to 
undocumented aliens.100  However, it is conceded that any Tennessee driver’s 
licenses that fail to meet the federal verification procedures would possess 
limitations not possessed by those driving licenses meeting the federal 
standards.101  Any state driver’s license failing to meet the federal verifications 
standard is not capable of being used for admission to federal facilities or to 
board a federally regulated commercial aircraft.102 
It is customary for the United States Supreme Court to approve a finding of 
preemption only when a federal statute demands it.103  A conclusion of 
preemption is virtually always based on the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
statutory language or of regulations unmistakably endorsed by Congress.104  
According to Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court has never endorsed federal 
administrative action whose one and only purpose is to preempt state law 
instead of implementing a statutory command of Congress.105  Since the REAL 
ID Act provides states with elective identification verification procedures, and 
it is not impossible to comply with the federal law and the Tennessee driving 
certificates requirement, a congressional declaration of preemption is not 
properly found.  The fact that Congress allows alternative verification under 
the REAL ID Act shows that Congress did not intend for federal law to occupy 
the field of issuing valid driving licenses or certificates.106  When Congress 
addresses a specific subject matter, a state law is to be acknowledged as 
preempted because it conflicts with what Congress has intended.107  A federal 
court has no independent power under the Supremacy Clause to preempt state 
law.  In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court established that it is an essential 
principle of constitutional law under Article VI, Clause 2, that only Congress 
has the power to preempt state law.108  States may use their police power to 
regulate illegal aliens “where such action mirrors federal objectives and 
furthers a legitimate state goal.”109 
 
 100. Contra LULAC II, 2005 WL 2034935, at *2. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S.Ct. 1559, 1585–86 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)); see also Florida Lime and 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (holding that  a conflict between 
federal and state law precluded obedience to both sovereigns); Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. 
Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926) (explaining that when a federal statute so completely occupies a 
field, it leaves no room for additional state regulation). 
 104. Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1586. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915). 
 107. Id. 
 108. 22 U.S. 1, 11 (1824). 
 109. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982). 
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The Tennessee law is not preempted by the REAL ID Act because the 
Tennessee driving law regulating driving certificates for aliens unlawfully 
present in the United States does not conflict with that federal law: “[I]mplicit 
in the REAL ID act is the federal recognition that states can legally issue 
driver’s licenses without a person being in a position to establish his legal 
presence in the United States.”110  The REAL ID Act does not allow states to 
use its local laws to make unlawful presence in the United States a crime.111  In 
State v. Lopez, Neri Lopez was stopped by the New Orleans Police Department 
after officers noticed that the vehicle he was driving had malfunctioning brake 
lights.112  When his driver’s license was requested, Lopez gave only Mexican 
identification.113  After the officers established that Lopez was not legally in 
America, he was arrested.114  Louisiana law prohibits nonresident aliens and 
alien students from driving motor vehicles unless they provide documentation 
establishing they are lawfully entitled to be in the United States.115  The trial 
court granted Lopez the motion to quash the bill of information because proof 
of citizenship is not in general an element of a standard traffic stop in 
Louisiana.116  In State v. Lopez “the trial court found that operating a motor 
vehicle without proof of citizenship, if it were a crime, would be a federal 
offense that the state of Louisiana does not have authority to regulate.”117  
Louisiana’s Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s 
judgment was legally correct.118 
The State of Louisiana has the power to regulate its public roads and 
highways if the legislation does not conflict with the United States 
Constitution.119  The states with heightened requirements for aliens to acquire a 
driver’s license have been upheld as a valid use of a state’s police power.120 
No federal requirement exists, however, that requires persons who are 
legally present in the United States to at all times carry documentation 
of proof of citizenship. Unlike other states’ restrictions regarding the 
issuance of driver’s licenses, [the Louisiana law] makes the operation 
 
 110. State v. Lopez, 2005-0685 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06); 948 So. 2d 1121, 1125. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1122. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Lopez, 2005-0685 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06); 948 So. 2d at 1122 (citing LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:100.13(A) (2004)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1123. 
 118. Id. at 1125. 
 119. Id. at 1124 (citing Kaltenbach v. Breaux, 690 F. Supp. 1551, 1553 (W.D. La. 1988)). 
 120. Lopez, 2005-0685 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06); 948 So. 2d at 1124–25. 
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of a motor vehicle while illegally present in the United States a 
crime.121 
Lopez was charged with driving a motor vehicle without producing 
documentation proving lawful presence.122  Lopez was not charged with living 
in the country illegally while driving a motor vehicle.123  The definitive 
problem with the Louisiana law, the court found, was that it placed a burden 
equally on legal and non-legal immigrants, which surpassed any standard 
considered appropriate under federal immigration law.124  The appellate court 
held that the Louisiana law, which made it a crime to drive a motor vehicle 
when lacking evidence of lawful presence in United States, is preempted by the 
Federal REAL ID Act because that Act does not allow states to use its driver’s 
license laws to make it a crime for an immigrant to fail to establish legal 
presence in United States.125 
In Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Judge Sam A. 
Lindsay granted the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order enjoining the 
enforcement of Farmers Branch Ordinance 2903 because it was preempted by 
the Supremacy Clause.126  The preamble to Ordinance 2903 said the city would 
benefit from the Federal HUD citizenship and immigration status certification 
processes.127  It appears that Farmers Branch was attempting to suggest that, by 
certifying the immigration status of immigrants for apartment rentals, it was 
protecting the general welfare of the public as well as implementing a federal 
policy required by HUD.128  It is self-evident that a finding that Ordinance 
2903 probably violates the Supremacy Clause would reject the suggestion that 
the ordinance was designed to implement any immigration certifications 
polices of HUD.  It is clear that Congress did not intend for 24 C.F.R. section  
5.504’s definition section about citizenship and status issues to apply to non-
covered housing.129  The immigration and citizenship status determinations 
under 24 C.F.R. section 5.504 were designed to apply to three specific federal 
programs: (1) the Section 235 Program, (2) the Section 236 Program which 
 
 121. Id. at 1125. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Lopez, 2005-0685 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06); 948 So. 2d at 1125. 
 126. No. 3:06-CV-2371-L, 2007 WL 1498763, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2007). 
 127. Id. 
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 129. 24 C.F.R. § 5.504 (2006)  (“Housing covered programs means the following programs 
administered by the Assistant Secretary for Housing: (1) Section 235 of the National Housing Act 
(12 U.S.C. 1715z) (the Section 235 Program); (2) Section 236 of the National Housing Act (12 
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Supplement Program)”). 
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allows tenants to pay below market rent, and (3) the Section 101 the Rent 
Supplement Program.130  Unlike the definitions of 24 C.F.R. section 5.504, 
which are designed to enforce federal housing policies for specific federal 
programs, the goal of Ordinance 2903 is to make immigration eligibility 
decisions for local purposes only rather than to advance any federal 
objective.131  Subsection (2) of Ordinance 2903 requires that prior to entering 
into any rental agreement for housing that an owner or property owner must 
determine a prospective tenant’s eligible immigration status.132  It is obvious 
that Farmers Branch’s eligible immigration status requirement is not limited to 
those specific programs covered under 24 C.F.R. section 5.504.133  Ordinance 
2903 places an affirmative duty on the owner and or property owner to check 
prospective tenants for evidence of eligible immigration status.134  Under 
section 6 of Ordinance 2903 anyone found guilty of violating the ordinance 
committed a misdemeanor, was subject to a fine not to exceed $500, and an 
independent offense occurred every day that the violation continued to exist.135  
A temporary restraining order is by definition “a temporary measure to protect 
rights until a hearing can be held.”136  The federal district court concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ challenge to Ordinance 2903, as preempted under the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, had a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits.137 
In De Canas v. Bica, the Supreme Court held that only the federal 
government may regulate immigration.138  The “[p]ower to regulate 
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”139  In contrast to 
Farmers Branch, in De Canas, California used the state labor code to improve 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Parkside Partners, 2007 WL 1498763, at *2. 
 132. Id. at *3 (citing FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., ORDINANCE 2903 § 3(B)(f)(2) (January 22, 
2007)). 
 133. Id. at *11. 
 134. Id. at *4 (citing FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., ORDINANCE 2903 § 4).       
 135. Id. (citing FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., ORDINANCE 2903 § 6).       
 136. Parkside Partners, 2007 WL 1498763, at *2. 
There are four prerequisites for the extraordinary relief of a temporary restraining order or 
preliminary injunction. To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) a substantial likelihood 
of success on the merits; (ii) a substantial threat of immediate and irreparable harm for 
which it has no adequate remedy at law; (iii) that greater injury will result from denying 
the temporary restraining order than from it being granted; and (iv) that a temporary 
restraining order will not disserve the public interest . . . .  The party seeking such relief 
must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before 
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction can be granted. 
Id. at *3. 
 137. Id. at *4. 
 138. 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976). 
 139. Id. 
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its economy by embracing federal standards in inflicting criminal penalties 
against state employers who knowingly hire aliens who do not have a federal 
right to employment in the United States; even if California’s local regulation 
has some indirect impact on immigration, it is a constitutionally permissible 
because Congress has the power to authorize the approach taken by 
California.140  In Parkside Partners, the federal district court properly 
determined that, by approving Ordinance 2903, Farmers Branch “has not . . . 
adopted federal . . . regulations, as required by . . . De Canas . . . , but rather 
[the city] has adopted federal housing regulations used to determine 
noncitizens’ eligibility for assistance.”141  The court found Ordinance 2903 to 
be preempted because it constitutes a regulation of immigration, “a regulatory 
power reserved for the federal government.”142  The fact that undocumented 
immigrants are the subject of a local regulation does not render the law a 
regulation of immigration, “[which is essentially] a determination of who 
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under 
which a legal entrant may remain.”143  I believe that the federal courts should 
expand the rationale of De Canas to hold that a regulation of immigration also 
occurs when a state or local government attempts to regulate the conditions 
under which illegal aliens or undocumented immigrants remain in this country.  
In Parkside Partners, the practical effect of the court issuing the temporary 
restraining order was to deny the city the right to determine by local regulation 
the conditions under which undocumented immigrants remain in this 
country.144 
The power to regulate immigration from both a historical and 
constitutional perspective has been entrusted to the federal government, and 
local governments should avoid enforcing distinctively local immigration 
laws.145  According to Barbara Hines, a clinical-law professor at the University 
of Texas and director of the University’s Immigration Clinic, a temporary 
restraining order, though temporary and not ultimately determinative on the 
merits, is an important step.146  Striking down Ordinance 2903 by means of a 
preliminary injunction conveys an important signal that similar ordinances are 
likely to violate the Constitution.147 
Principles of preemption therefore dictate that local governments, 
including states, may not enact laws hostile to undocumented immigrants.  
 
 140. Id. at 355–56. 
 141. Parkside Partners, 2007 WL 1498763, at *7. 
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Because the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a 
federal power,”148 local governments may not enact and enforce local 
legislation not authorized by Congress.  The Court’s De Canas rationale 
should be interpreted broadly to hold that local regulations of the conditions 
under which undocumented immigrants remain in the United States are also 
preempted by federal authority on matters of immigration. 
CONCLUSION 
 I think one can easily conclude that America as a nation is substantially in 
need of a political and constitutional reality check as to how to use its legal 
processes to treat undocumented immigrants with moral justice.  The court 
recognized this much in Parkside Partners: 
The court recognizes that illegal immigration is a major problem in this 
country, and one who asserts otherwise ignores reality. The court also fully 
understands the frustration of cities attempting to address a national problem 
that the federal government should handle; however, such frustration, no 
matter how great, cannot serve as a basis to pass an ordinance that conflicts 
with federal law.149 
Until Congress can adequately address the immigration issue, I believe the 
courts should continue to use the Supremacy Clause to protect undocumented 
immigrants from hostile legal action by local governmental actors.  Applying 
the suspect class rationale and the Supremacy Clause when addressing issues 
of undocumented immigration are excellent means to protect those individuals 
unable to protect themselves in the local political process from local 
governmental attempts to regulate immigration. 
The Carolene Products goal of protecting those unable to protect 
themselves in the political process, when extended to illegal immigrants, 
prohibits local governmental actors from regulating the conditions in which 
they remain in this country without congressional approval. Local communities 
are served well when they are properly advised that the United States 
Constitution grants the United States Congress the exclusive power to establish 
uniform rules for regulating immigration.150  I think federal courts should 
apply the rationale of Carolene Products to the exclusive power of the federal 
government to regulate immigration to protect illegal immigrants from local 
regulations designed to determine the conditions under which those illegal or 
undocumented immigrants remain in this country. 
In the framework of immigration, local efforts to regulate immigration by 
placing hostile burdens exclusively on illegal immigrants who, by definition, 
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cannot vote, are appropriately treated as suspect and are preempted by the 
Supremacy Clause because only Congress has the power to regulate 
immigration.  Until the executive branch of the federal government has the 
political courage to enforce federal law prohibiting illegal immigration, the 
federal courts are obligated to protect all immigrants from local laws designed 
to regulate immigration.  When a city establishes exclusively local laws for 
determining the conditions under which an undocumented immigrant remains 
in that community it is regulating immigration in violation of the Supremacy 
Clause. 
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